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AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE SLOVENES IN TRIESTE, 1941-1974 
Bogdan C. Novak 
This article deals with two aspects of the American pol-
icy toward the Slovenes in Trieste. It discusses first 
the American military and diplomatic actions in regard 
to Slovene territorial claims and then, second, describes 
the role played by the American members of the Allied 
Military Government (AMG) toward the Slovenes living in 
the so-called Zone A of the Julian Region. l 
Initially, however, it is necessary to clarify cer-
tain geographical terms. In examining the Trieste prob-
lem we must distinguish between the Julian Region, the 
Free Territory of Trieste, and the Italian province of 
Trieste. Each of these geographical areas was different 
in size and had Trieste as the most important city and 
seaport. The Julian Region, also known as Venezia 
Giulia in Italian and Julijska K~ajina (Julian March) in 
Slovene, was the largest of the three and encompassed 
all the territory between the old pre-World War I Italo-
Austrian and the pre-World War II Italo-Yugoslav borders. 
In other words, these were Habsburg lands which went to 
Italy after World War I and were inhabited by Slovenes, 
Croats and Italians. The northern part of the Julian 
Region was Slovene, the southern was Croat, while in the 
cities of Gorizia (Gorica), Trieste (Trst) and in the 
Gradisca district, in the municipalities along the west-
ern Istrian coast and in Rijeka (Fiume) Italians re-
sided. The northern part of the Julian Region was also 
called the Slovene Littoral, which can be subdivided 
from north to south into the Kanal Valley, the old Aus-
trian county of Gorizia, the Trieste municipality, and 
northern Istria. West of the Julian Region was Venetian 
Slovenia, which went to Italy in 1866. 2 The Julian Re-
gion played an important role until 1947, when it was 
divided into three parts: the larger went to Yugoslavia, 
the smaller to Italy, while the remainder formed the new-
ly created Free Territory of Trieste, or FTT. The FTT, 
with Trieste as its capital, lasted from 1947 until 1954, 
when it was divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. Since 
then Trieste and its environs have been part of the Re-
public of Italy. 
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In order to demonstrate the essentially harmful 
character of American policy toward the Slovene terri-
torial claims concerning Trieste I shall proceed as fol-
lows: first by a chronological review of these claims 
and related events together with the American position 
on them and, second, to discover the reasons which led 
the United States to adopt this detrimental policy. 
The Axis conquest of Yugoslavia in April 1941 forced 
the then Yugoslav Government to flee into exile. There, 
on May 1, 1941, it issued a document called Memorandum on 
the Slovene Territorial Claims which had been prepared by 
the Slovene members of the government. 3 In this state-
ment the Slovene spokesmen demanded the unification of 
all the Slovene lands outside Yugoslavia with those which 
had been within the prewar Yugoslav state. From Italy, 
in particular, they claimed Venetian Slovenia and the 
Slovene Littoral, including the cities of Trieste and 
Gorizia. This Memorandum was handed to the British and 
other allied governments. 
The British responses to the Slovene claims, and 
subsequently the American answers as well, remained 
vague. Individual members of the British Government, for 
example, told Miha Krek, a Slovene minister in the Yugo-
slav Government-in-exile, that the Slovenes could be 
hopeful of obtaining from Italy after the war whatever 
Yugoslavia justifiably would demand. This cautious as-
surance, however, was given only in private conversa-
tion. 4 The American attitude was similar. On September 
7, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt told the Yugo-
slav Ambassador in Washington, Konstantin Fotie, that 
injustices done in 1919 to Yugoslavia would be corrected 
after the present conflict was over. 5 Finally, in his 
August 1944 meeting with Marshal Josip Broz Tito in 
Italy, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill explained 
that any territorial changes would have to be approved 
by the President of the United States, who was against 
such alterations in time of war. 6 Thus neither the 
United States nor Great Britain were willing to discuss 
Slovene claims before the end of the war or to indicate 
where the postwar Italo-Yugoslav border would run. 
Closely related to all this was a plan according to 
which the British and American armies would occupy the 
entire Julian Region. They would then introduce their 
own military government to administer the area until a 
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peace treaty would decide what part of the territory 
would go to Italy and what part to Yugoslavia. Both the 
American and British governments agreed to this arrange-
ment but only the United States retained its position 
almost until the end of the war. This was shown in a 
declaration made by the State Department to Alberto 
Tarchiani, the Italian Ambassador in Washington, on 
April 19, 1945--only two weeks before the end of the war 
in Europe--to the effect that British and American 
forces, and not Yugoslav, would occupy the entire Julian 
Region up to the 1939 border. 7 
For its part, however, Great Britain began to change 
its position in the fall of 1944. Many reasons were re-
sponsible for this. Soviet troops by then were advancing 
into the Danubian flatland and this enabled Marshal Tito 
and his Partisans to install themselves in Belgrade and 
to rule over the eastern part of Yugoslavia as the newly 
recognized government. Moreover, Tito's Partisans came 
into control of parts of the Julian Region, which Tito 
claimed repeatedly as Yugoslav territory. To avoid any 
further misunderstandings, and any clashes between Allied 
and Yugoslav military forces, the British favored a line 
marking where the British-American and the Yugoslav 
troops would meet. It was to run north and south and to 
divide the Julian Region into two parts. Such a proposal 
was prepared by the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony 
Eden, for the Yalta Conference at the beginning of Feb-
ruary 1945. The western part of the Julian Region with 
Trieste and a line of communications to Austria via 
Gorizia would be left in British-American hands, while 
the territory east of the line would ~o to Yugoslavia in 
accordance with the ethnic principle. But the United 
States opposed this plan and it was not discussed at 
Yalta. 9 
Similarly, Field Marshal Harold Alexander, the su-
preme allied commander for the Mediterranean, could not 
conclude an agreement on the demarcation line with 
Marshal Tito when he visited Belgrade during the second 
half of February 1945. Marshal Alexander had a map with 
him on which a line was drawn dividing the Julian Region 
into two parts, but he could not propose it because of 
American opposition. Instead he had to insist that 
British-American troops would occupy and administer the 
entire region, even though Marshal Tito explained that 
this was contrary to vital Yugoslav interests. 10 The 
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absence of a satisfactory agreement led to competition 
between the Allied and Yugoslav military forces in April 
1945 over which of them would first occupy the Julian 
Region, particularly the city of Trieste. The contest 
was a very close one. The Slovene Ninth Partisan Corps 
and the Yugoslav Fourth Army entered Trieste on May 1, 
1945, one day before a New Zealand division, the first 
Allied force, approached the city.lI The Slovenes were 
especially eager that their troops enter Trieste first 
because of a lesson Italy had taught them at the end of 
World War I and which they had not forgotten: Whatever 
territory you occupy and have in your possession likely 
will remain yours, while everything else remains ques-
tionable and is dependent on the good will of other par-
ties. 
5 
The Yugoslav forces which occupied the entire Julian 
Region introduced their own administration and demanded 
that the Allied military units in Trieste and Gorizia 
evacuate the area. This development changed the previous 
American position and the United States government now 
accepted the British idea of a demarcation line. Marshal 
Alexander sent his chief of staff, General William D. 
MOrgan, to Belgrade, this time with full American sup-
port, to propose a demarcation line between Allied and 
Yugoslav occupation forces. The Yugoslavs refused to 
accede. Finally, however, the United States and Great 
Britain put diplomatic pressure on Yugoslavia and de-
manded the Yugoslavs evacuate the region west of the new 
line. To reinforce this attitude American troops crossed 
the Soca (Isonzo) river on May 21, 1945 and began advanc-
ing eastward. This step had the explicit backing of 
President Harry S. Truman. 12 The Yugoslavs had to accept 
the proposed solution in order to avoid a military 
clash. The agreement accordingly was signed in Belgrade 
on June 9, 1945 by Morgan and Yugoslav General Arso 
Jovanovic. It divided the Julian Region into two zones, 
the western (Zone A) to be occupied and administered by 
the British-American Allied Military Government (AMG) and 
the eastern (Zone B) by the Yugoslavs. The line dividing 
the two zones was called the Morgan line--after General 
Morgan--and ran from north to south. Zone A included 
Trieste, Gorizia and a strip of land along the Soca river 
connecting the port of Trieste with Austria. The city of 
Pula in southern Istria was a separate enclave also be-
longing to Zone A. Yugoslav military units evacuated 
Zone A on June 12, 1945. 13 Although the majority of the 
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Julian Region went to Yugoslavia the Slovenes did suffer 
important setbacks. The two principal cities of Trieste 
and Gorizia along with the entire Slovene coast west of 
Trieste came under allied military administration, while 
Venetian Slovenia remained part of Italy. 
It is clear to this author that official American 
policy demonstrated little understanding for Slovene 
territorial claims through the end of World War II. 
Moreover, subsequent events proved the British approach 
to be correct. The American government agreed to a com-
promise at the last moment, a compromise which turned out 
to be somewhat better for the Slovenes and Croats than 
the original proposal prepared by Anthony Eden in Feb-
ruary. On the other hand, however, it did lead to con-
siderable tension between Yugoslavia and the two western 
allies, and especially with the United States. The ten-
sion increased greatly during the peace negotiations in 
1946 and in August of that year came to tragic conse-
quences when the Yugoslavs forced one American plane to 
land and another was shot down. 14 These incidents were 
in part the result of the position taken by the United 
States at the peace talks, a position pointedly harmful 
to Slovene territorial claims. 
This detrimental American position was illustrated 
clearly for the first time in the spring of 1946. The 
substitutes of the foreign ministers of the four great 
powers--France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States--decided to send a commission of experts to 
the Julian Region to acquaint itself with the land 
claimed both by Italy and Yugoslavia and to make appro-
priate recommendations. The commission was composed of 
four delegations, one for each of the powers, and it vis-
ited the Julian Region in March, 1946. Because the ex-
perts could not agree among themselves as to the proper 
border their report, dated April 29, 1946, and addressed 
to the Council of Foreign Ministers, included four sep-
arate proposals. 1S The western powers basically support-
ed Italy, while the Soviet Union backed Yugoslavia. How-
ever, the western powers disagreed as to how much of the 
Julian Region should go to Italy. The line proposed by 
the American delegation, headed by Professor Philip 
Mosely, was farthest to the east and therefore the most 
damaging to Yugoslavia. Next came the British line, 
slightly less harmful, while the French was a kind of 
compromise lying between the Soviet and American extremes. 
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With respect to Slovene territory, the fact is that the 
three lines as they ran from the Austro-Yugoslav border 
in the north to the bay of Trieste near Monfalcone 
(Trzic) in the south did not differ greatly. They began 
to diverge in the southern area, in Croatian Istria. The 
American and British lines were almost identical, while 
the French line allotted more territory to Slovenia north 
and south of Gorizia. However, all three lines cut 
Slovenia off from the three major urban centers of the 
Slovene Littoral, the cities of Gorizia, Trieste and 
Koper (Capodistria). Slovenia would also lose its entire 
Adriatic coast and thereby any independent access to the 
sea. The Kanal valley in the north and Venetian Slovenia 
were also lost. 
Among all the territory in dispute the greatest dip-
lomatic struggle at the Paris peace conference in 1946 
was fought over the fate of Trieste. The first steps 
were taken in May of that year when the three western 
powers agreed to accept the French line as the future 
Italo-Yugoslav border. But the Soviet Union refused to 
accept this solution and continued to demand that Trieste 
go to Yugoslavia. Finally, however, a compromise solu-
tion was achieved and was made public on July 3, 1946. 
From the Austrian border to the Adriatic near Monfalcone 
the French line was accepted as the permanent border be-
tween Italy and Yugoslavia. The land south of this and 
west of the French line would form a new international 
body to be called the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT). 
The nothern part of this region would include the city 
of Trieste and a narrow strip of land connecting it with 
the new Italian border. 16 This part of the FTT belonged 
to Zone A and was administered by a British-American 
military government. The southern part would be made up 
of two districts, Koper and Buje (Buie), which were part 
of Zone B and ruled by Yugoslav military authorities. 
These main decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
remained unchanged and became part of the Treaty of 
Peace with Italy which was signed in Paris on February 
10, 1947 and entered into force in September of the same 
year. 17 
The loss of Trieste further embittered the Slovene 
attitude toward America. The Slovenes were convinced 
that the United States, the most powerful and important 
of the western allies, contributed greatly to this dis-
appointing solution. They could not understand why the 
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United States supported Italy, which not only had invaded 
Slovene and Yugoslav territory, burning and devastating 
the land and sending many among the native population to 
concentration camps, but also had fought against the 
western allies while, on the other hand, most Slovenes 
and Yugoslavs fought throughout the war on the allied 
side. 
In spite of the 1947 peace treaty, however, the Tri-
este question was not resolved and instead continued to 
disturb the diplomatic atmosphere. Approximately during 
the period from September 1947 until March 1951 American 
policy remained friendly toward Italy and detrimental to-
ward the Slovenes. Beginning in March 1951 the attitude 
of the United States changed toward a more neutral 
stance. The explanation for these events is curious. 
The Peace Treaty with Italy stipulated that the 
northern part of the Free Territory of Trieste, which 
once was part of Zone A of the Julian Region, would con-
tinue to be administered by the British-American military 
government, and the southern part which formerly belonged 
to the Yugoslav Zone B was to stay under Yugoslav mili-
tary rule. This provisional situation was to remain in 
force until the nomination of a governor by the Security 
Council of the United Nations. IS Because of cold war 
antagonisms, however, the great powers could not agree on 
the person to become governor and so the military admin-
istration endured until 1954. Hence, the Free Territory 
of Trieste had two zones and was governed by two mili-
tary authorities. The British-United States Zone, or 
Zone A, was in the north and the Yugoslav Zone, or Zone 
B, was in the south. The latter included the Slovene 
district of Koper and Croatian Buje. In order to avoid 
confusion it is necessary to distinguish Zones A and B 
of the FTT from Zones A and B of the Julian Region. The 
latter existed only until September 15, 1947, when the 
peace treaty came into force. After that time there were 
only Zones A and B of the FTT. 
When it became evident that the great powers could 
not agree on a governor, France, Great Britain and the 
United States on March 20, 1948 issued a joint statement 
which postulated that the entire FTT should be returned 
to Italy.19 This document was also called the Tripartit~ 
or March Declaration. Formally it was a proposal ad-
dressed to the Soviet Union and Italy--but not to Yugo-
slavia--and asked them to join the western powers in 
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amending the peace treaty so that the Free Territory 
would return to Italian sovereignty. In connection with 
the Tripartite Declaration the United States handed Italy 
a separate memorandum, also dated March 20, 1948. 20 The 
documents were similar but not identical. It is illus-
trative for an evaluation of the American position to 
compare the national or ethnic arguments in both docu-
ments. The Tripartite Declaration said: 
During the Council of Foreign Ministers' 
discussions of the Italian peace treaty it was 
the consistent position of the American, British, 
and French representatives that Trieste~ which 
has an ove~helmingly Italian population~ must 
remain an Italian City.21 (Italics added.) 
But the United States memorandum to Italy read: 
It will be recalled that the Government of 
the United States has consistently maintained 
that the entire area of the Free Territory is 
ethnically and historically Italian territory . 
••• 22 (Italics added.) 
The comparison is obvious. While the Tripartite Declara-
tion limits itself to the city of Trieste, the American 
memorandum calls the entire FTT ethnically and histori-
cally Italian. 
The tripartite proposal increased the Italian influ-
ence in the British-American Zone and in 1952 provided 
the basis for the participation of the Italian government 
in the administration of the Zone. For Italian statesmen 
it became a welcome instrument to remind the western pow-
ers, and especially the United States, that they had a 
moral obligation--if not a legal one--to fulfill Italian 
claims to the Free Territory of Trieste. For tne Slo-
venes in Zone A, meanwhile, the Declaration marked the 
end of favorable AMG policy toward their national inter-
ests. And in the eyes of these Slovenes the Americans 
were again the main culprits. 
Yet only some three months after the Tripartite 
Declaration important changes occurred within the Soviet 
bloc. On June 28, 1948 the Soviet Union and its commun-
ist allies expelled Tito and his top aides from the Com-
munist Information Bureau, or Cominform. 23 The conse-
quent bitter split between the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia represented a great diplomatic gain and strategic 
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advantage for the United States. So it is no surprise 
that American policy toward the FTT underwent change, al-
though not immediately. It took a long time before the 
United States was convinced that the Soviet-Yugoslav 
split was real, and still longer before it altered its 
policy toward the FTT. Not until 1951 did the United 
States change its basic position that most of the FTT 
should be returned to Italy. From 1951 onward, however, 
the United States did accept the premise that the FTT 
would have to be divided more equitably between Italy and 
Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, America would continue to 
favor Italy and hesitate to put pressure on it. 
In accordance with the new approach, in the spring 
of 1951 the United States and Great Britain began to 
encourage both Italy and Yugoslavia to come to a satis-
factory agreement via direct negotiations. 24 When this 
recommendation proved fruitless Great Britain proposed a 
partition of the FTT along the existing zonal line and 
giving Zone A to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia. This 
plan was prepared by British Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden in September 1952 and provided for a British-Ameri-
can evacuation of Zone A and its transfer to Italian ad-
ministration. Italy and Yugoslavia then could annex 
their respective zones, provided that Italy gave assur-
ances for free port facilities in Trieste and that both 
countries gave guarantees of fair treatment for the re-
spective national minorities. 25 Eden argued that the 
plan would work only if Italy and Yugoslavia were made 
to understand that it was final. But while Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson agreed with Eden's proposal he was un-
willing to force it upon Italy as a final solution.~ 
Because Italy refused to accept the plan voluntarily the 
United States--first via Acheson and then, in 1953, via 
the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles--prepared 
several additional alternative solutions, all of which 
favored Italy. According to these proposals Italy would 
receive the entire coast of Zone A as well as the coastal 
towns of Koper, Izola (Isola), and Piran (Pirano), all of 
which were in Zone B. In return for these concessions 
from Zone B Yugoslavia would receive the Slovene munipal-
ities in the interior of Zone A. These plans would 
therefore divide the FTT by a line running from north to 
south while the existing zonal division cut the territory 
in an east-west direction. Thus the American proposals 
of late 1952 and early 1953 would separate Slovenia from 
its seashore and provide only for a small port south of 
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Piran. Yet Italy rejected even these generous proposals. 
Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi demanded the en-
tire coast of Zone A and most of that of Zone B. This 
would disjoin Slovenia altogether from the Adriatic Sea. 
In spite of this the United States accepted these Italian 
demands even though it forwarded them to Yugoslavia in 
May 1953 merely as a possibility for a future agree-
ment. 27 
To ameliorate a strained situation which was brought 
about by Italian and Yugoslav political and military ac-
tions during the summer of 1953 the United States and 
Great Britain on October 8, 1953 issued a joint announce-
ment which was of American inspiration. Secretary of 
State Dulles now accepted Eden's 1952 ~roposal but still 
refused to press it on Italy as final. 8 He would go no 
further than to say that "the two governments expect that 
the measures being taken will lead to a final solu tion • ,,29 
Because Yugoslavia refused to accept this British-Ameri-
can initiative, and in the wake of bloody rioting in 
Trieste in November 1953, during which Italian and Yugo-
slav armed forces moved to the border, negotiations began 
between Yugoslavia and Italy in London, using the good 
offices of the United States and Great Britain. The 
talks proceeded in stages and lasted from February to 
October 1954. An agreement finally was concluded and a 
"Memorandum of Understanding" initialed in London on 
October 5, 1954. 30 In essence this was still the propos-
al made by Eden in 1952, albeit with some minor territor-
ial changes and with an elaborate Special Statute which 
listed in detail the rights of the Slovene minority in 
Zone A and the Italian minority in Zone B. Yugoslavia 
obtained a small part of Zone A's territory along the 
zonal boundary and Italy had to guarantee Yugoslavia free 
port facilities in Trieste. The agreement was st'ill not 
final in form, however, as both Italy and Yugoslavia ex-
tended only their civil administration over the new ter-
ritory and nothing was said about their sovereignty. 
This was a concession to Italy, which was not prepared 
publicly to renounce its claims to Zone B, and without 
doubt was achieved with American support. Yet in order 
to obtain Yugoslav acceptance the western powers assured 
Yugoslavia that as far as they were concerned the solution 
was a final one. In compliance with this pledge American 
Secretary of State Dulles issued a special announcement on 
October 5, 1954, the same day the "Memorandum of Under-
standing" was initialed. 31 In his statement Dulles said: 
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The United States Government takes this oppor-
tunity to declare it will give no support to 
claims of either Yugoslavia or Italy to terri-
tory under the sovereignty or administration 
of the other. 32 
France and Great Britain issued almost identical state-
ments. 33 Dulles' pledge has remained the American pol-
icy toward Trieste and was reaffirmed publicly in 1974 
when there was a renewed dispute between Italy and Yugo-
slavia over the former Zone B. 34 This most recent re-
confirmation of the American attitude was prompted by 
suspicions on the part of the Slovene and Yugoslav public 
that the United States again had given secret diplomatic 
and military support to Italian claims as evidenced by 
American participation in military maneuvres in the bay 
of Trieste during the 1974 crisis. 35 These Slovene sus-
picions came as no surprise to anyone familiar with the 
traditional pro-Italian policy of the United States. 
Now it is necessary to turn to the explanation as to 
why the United States pursued the policy described above. 
While many factors were involved the single most impor-
tant and overt was the need felt by successive American 
governments to contain the spread of communism. Many 
Americans regarded Tito's march on Trieste as a vanguard 
of communism and employing the same kind of aggressive 
behavior reminiscent of the Axis in World War 11. 36 Once 
established in Trieste themselves, American representa-
tives had ample opportunity to learn about the massacres 
committed by the communists of their anti-communist and 
Italian opponents allover the Julian Region. They also 
learned about similar massacres in nearby Yugoslavia. 37 
These revelations helped shape American opinion to the 
effect that whatever was Slovene or Croat in the Julian 
Region was also pro-communist while, conversely, what-
ever was Italian was by definition pro-western and pro-
democratic. Italian propaganda, not surprisingly, con-
tributed substantially to the creation and sustenance of 
this image. 
Anti-communism also was the principal reason for 
publication of the Tripartite Declaration of March 1948, 
in which the three western powers accused Yugoslavia of 
virtually incorporating Zone B into its state and of ex-
tending the communist social order into the zone. 38 A 
further irritant to the western powers was the fact that 
Yugoslavia was one of the main supporters of the commun-
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ist Greek guerillas during the Greek civil war of the 
late 1940s. 39 The American government ~nterpreted this 
as part of a general design to spread communism further 
into western Europe. When the previously democratic co-
alition government in Czechoslovakia fell in February 
1948 and was replaced by a communist regime, President 
Truman decided the United States should act vigorously to 
prevent any further spread of communism. The Tripartite 
Declaration was a characteristic expression of Truman's 
containment policy.4o The Declaration was also the re-
sult of grave American concern that the Italian Communist 
party might defeat the pro-western Christian Democrats in 
the Italian parliamentary elections scheduled for April 
18, 1948. 41 This American fear about a possible Commun-
ist victory in Italy subsequently was exploited success-
fully by the Italian government when it emphasized that 
any concession to Yugoslavia in the Trieste dispute could 
cause a defeat of the democratic forces in the country 
and bring victory to the communists. 42 Finally, the fact 
that the United States changed its attitude toward Yugo-
slavia, and also on the Trieste question after the Yugo-
slav expulsion from the Cominform, further confirmed the 
validity of the aforementioned anti-communist arguments. 
A second persistent feature of American policy was 
the supposition that Gorizia, Trieste and the Slovene 
Adriatic coast were parts of Italian territory. The ex-
planation for this misconception lies in the greater 
familiarity of an educated American with Italian civili-
zation. In his eyes Italy represents the continuation of 
the esteemed Greco-Roman tradition enriched by the works 
of Dante, Petrarch, and the great Renaissance artists. 
But what does such an educated American know about the 
Slovenes? Very little, if indeed he is cognizant of 
their existence at all. In view of this it is not sur-
prising to discover similarly deficient knowledge, if not 
outright ignorance, about the history and geography of the 
Julian Region. Just one example to illustrate the prob-
lem. Trieste was referred to in the American memorandum 
of March 20, 1948 as being historically an Italian city, 
this despite the fact it belonged to the Habsburgs from 
1382 until 1917, with only a brief interruption during 
the Napoleonic era when it was part of the so-called 
Illyrian Provinces. 43 Trieste became part of Italy only 
in 1918, at the conclusion of World War I. 
Closely connected with this educational aspect was 
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the American assumption that the countryside belonged to 
its town or city, a view reminiscent of Italian municipal 
traditions. In contrast the Slovenes, as well as the 
peoples of agricultural central and eastern Europe, as-
serted that towns and cities belonged to the land because 
they represented islands of the foreign dominant class 
which had exploited the agricultural native population. 
According to the municipal theory Gorizia, Trieste, 
Koper, Izola and Piran with their adjacent hinterland 
should go to Italy because the cities had an Italian ma-
jority. The Slovenes, however, insisted these cities 
should belong to Slovenia because ethnically they were 
isolated islands encircled by Slovene territory. 
Another source of difficulty was American unfamili-
arity with the European concept of what constitutes a 
nation. People who for centuries have lived on their own 
continuously settled territory, with their own literary 
language, who have common historical, cultural and eco-
nomic traditions, as well as their own national con-
sciousness are regarded in Europe as being a nation. 
This is so whether or not they also possess their own in-
dependent national state. Thus there are the Slovene, 
Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian nations, but not states. 
On the other hand there is a Yugoslav state but not a 
Yugoslav nation. The same is true with the Czechs and 
Slovaks, and with Czechoslovakia. The misunderstanding 
of this concept had grave consequences for the Slovenes 
at the Paris peace negotiations, where the great powers 
tried to find a balance between the size of the Italian 
and Yugoslav minorities to be left outside their mother 
country. The formula adopted was to compare the number 
of Italians to remain in Yugoslavia to the number of 
Yugoslavs to remain in Italy. Slovenes and Croats were 
grouped together as Yugoslavs. This meant in actual 
practice that while many Italians went to Croatia no 
Croats went to Italy, while many Slovenes were left in 
Italy but almost no Italians in Slovenia. In other 
words, the Slovene minority in Italy had to counterbal-
ance the Italian minority in Croatia, that in effect the 
Slovenes had to pay for the Croatian gains. 
Finally, there is the question of the role played by 
Italo-American and Slovene-American influences on the 
course of American policy toward the Trieste issue. Many 
well known Italian anti-fascist intellectuals and politi-
cal leaders lived in the United States during the 
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Mussolini era. During the war they conducted an anti-
fascist but also a pro-Italian propaganda. Gaetano 
Salvemini, for one example, published many books and 
pamphlets in the United States and these may well have 
exerted a degree of influence on American policy. 44 In 
addition, the role played by the many Italo-American cul-
tural organizations still awaits systematic analysis. 
For their part, of course, Slovene-Americans also were 
active, especially during the war. On December 5-6, 
1942 a Slovene National Congress held in Cleveland, Ohio, 
constituted and elected the Slovenski ameriski narodni 
svet - Slovenian American National Council, or SANS. The 
president of the Executive Committee was the socialist 
Etbin Kristan and the secretary was a Franciscan priest, 
the Rev. Kazimir Zakrajsek. 45 The famous-American writer 
Louis Adamic was the soul of the movement. The principal 
task of SANS was: 
to do all possible towards realization of the 
most cherished aspirations of the Slovenian 
nation--the ultimate unification of all the 
Slovenes, including those under the cruel yoke 
of Germany, Italy and Hungary prior to this 
war,--in a United Slovenia which shall become 
an autonomous part of a new, democratic, fed-
erative Jugoslavia. 46 
While in the beginning SANS represented a coalition of 
all Slovene-Americans concerned about the fate of Slo-
venia, in October 1943 and later many began to abandon 
the organization because it became apparent that SANS in 
effect was supporting the communist controlled Partisan 
movement led by Tito. 47 The split in SANS--and among 
Slovene-Americans--occurred just when an active support 
for Slovene claims was needed the most. The anti-SANS 
forces were unable and unwilling to support claims ad-
vanced by the Partisans and, after 1945, by Tito-led 
Yugoslavia. Moreover, agile SANS propaganda had some 
success in discrediting its opponents by labelling them 
as reactionaries and fascist sympathizers. Because of 
its de facto support for Tito and his communist system, 
however, SANS was placed on the United States Attorney 
General's list of subversive organizations and also lost 
any chance to intervene in behalf of Slovene claims with 
the American government. In reality this was a major 
tragedy for Slovene-Americans and for all Slovenes. 
Throughout the war Slovene-Americans sacrificed and sup-
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ported the allied efforts and yet by the end of the war 
they disqualified themselves and could make no substan-
tial contribution in support of Slovene national claims. 
* * * 
The second and final part of this article deals with 
the positive aspects of American policy on the Trieste 
question. Albeit in condensed form it seeks to outline 
the American contributions toward recognition of Slovene 
national rights in the former Zone A of the Julian Re-
gion. 
Although the British and American civil affairs of-
ficers who comprised the Allied Military Government CAMG) 
had to follow the policy lines laid down by their respec-
tive governments there was always some room left for in-
dividual actions. Therefore, while still remaining in 
compliance with such general directions, individual 
senior officers could contribute substantially to the 
local population on their own initiative. Two Americans, 
Colonel Alfred Connor Bowman and Captain John P. Simoni, 
were such concerned persons who helped the Zone A Slo-
venes considerably. Colonel Bowman was the Senior Civil 
Affairs Officer of the AMG and thus the administrative 
chief of ZQne A, while Captain Simoni was in charge of 
the AMG department of education. 
With the support of these two sympathetic officers 
the Slovenes obtained their most important institution, 
a state school system with Slovene as the language of 
instruction. A Slovene elementary school was organized 
in every community where there were twenty-five pupils 
in a radius of four kilometers. A network of kindergar-
ten schools also came into being. In the two cities of 
Gorizia and Trieste a number of secondary and other ad-
vanced schools were permitted; a high school (gymnasium) 
and a teacher's training school in Gorizia, a high 
school, a commercial academy, and a teacher's training 
school in Trieste. In Trieste, Gorizia and other towns 
vocational schools were formed. As there were no Slo-
vene textbooks available in Zone A and the Slovene books 
published in Yugoslavia contained communist propaganda, 
the AMG financed the publication of new Slovene language 
textbooks for all levels of schools. 48 
With respect to the adult Slovene population of Zone 
A the AMG published the daily Glas zaveznikov (The Voice 
of the Allies) in the Slovene language and also permitted 
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the publication of numerous other privately owned and in-
dependently edited newspapers, journals and reviews, 
among them the pro-Tito Primorski dnevnik (Coastal Daily). 
In the realm of public communications the Slovenes ob-
tained a radio station in Trieste for broadcasting the 
news in the Slovene language as well as cultural and 
other programs. In the same vein, the AMG permitted the 
organization and operation of Slovene cultural, religious 
and political organizations of all ideological persua-
sions, including the communist. For all of its proclama-
tions and decrees the AMG used English, Slovene and 
Italian, and the official AMG Gazette also appeared in 
all three languages. Slovene could be used in the AMG 
courts and Slovenes were accepted in the police force and 
in AMG offices. Finally, Slovenes were permitted to pe-
tition the AMG authorities for readoption of Slovene 
first and last names which had been Italianized forcibly 
during the fascist regime. 49 For example, Joze Vodopivec 
had been changed to Giuseppe Bevilacqua, which was a 
translation of both first and last names into Italian. 
In some cases only the first name was translated and the 
surname Italianized, as with Ivan Pogacnik becoming 
Giovanni Pogassi. 50 
The Zone A Slovenes could have obtained many more 
rights from the AMG but this was prevented by the be-
havior of the Slovene-Italian communist bloc in the Zone, 
which adopted a policy of no cooperation with the AMG. 
When the Yugoslav military forces had to retreat from 
Zone A in June 1945, the local Slovene-Italian communist 
elements demanded that the AMG accept the National Liber-
ation Committees and Councils as the established civil 
administration. The AMG indicated its willingness to 
cooperate with the communists but required that other 
political parties also participate in the civil adminis-
tration. This proposal was rejected by the communists, 
who thereupon engaged in outright opposition to the AMG. 
Colonel Bowman, in his monthly report for August 1945, 
accurately described the communist position: 
The attitude of the Regional National 
Liberation Council can be summed up as follows: 
We will willingly cooperate if the Allied 
Military Government will govern in accordance 
with our views and through our institutions, 
but we will not cooperate otherwise, as any 
other form of government is considered to be 
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Fascist and non-democratic. 51 
In consequence, during July and August 1945, the Slovenes 
lost a great opportunity to participate in the regional 
civil administration and in the administration of Tri-
este, Gorizia, and Monfalcone. 
Yet even this was not enough. The communists also 
sought to prohibit other Slovenes from participation. 
They launched a propaganda of slander against any such 
Slovenes. Those few Slovenes who dared to cooperate with 
the AMG and thereby save what could be saved in behalf of 
Slovene national interests were labelled as fascists and 
collaborators with the imperialist western powers. More-
o~er, the leaders among these Slovenes were threatened 
with death, and these were not empty threats. While 
Sreeko Baraga, the head of Slovene schools in Zone A, 
who was condemned to death by the Tito regime, survived, 
Slavko Ursie, the founder of the first Slovene democratic 
weekly Demokraaija (Democracy), was not so fortunate. He 
was kidnapped and taken across the border to Yugoslavia 
where he disappeared and has never been heard from since. 
Some Slovene teachers in rural districts were also kid-
napped and a few were killed in order to frighten the 
others and discourage their further cooperation with the 
AMG. 52 Given these conditions few Slovenes were willing 
to participate in civil administration in Zone A. The 
result was that the AMG formed new area and municipal 
councils composed of members of various Italian non-
communist political parties, which were quite eager to 
take all the administrative positions into their own 
hands. 
* * * 
In conclusion, I wish to recapitulate what has been 
ascertained in this article. First and foremost, Ameri-
can military and diplomatic policy toward the Slovenes 
in Trieste was unfavorable, if not downright detrimental, 
for the period 1945-1951. After 1951 the attitude was 
somewhat more friendly, but the United States continued 
to favor Italian claims until 1954. Since 1954 the 
American position has been relatively more neutral. While 
anti-communism was the principal justification for this 
unfriendly policy there were numerous other factors 
present including, as has been shown, simple ignorance as 
to the true situations, ethnically and historically, in 
the Julian Region. 
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At the same time, however, the Slovenes in Trieste 
did obtain confirmation of their basic national rights 
during the first two years after World War II, when the 
AMG was headed by Colonel Bowman. The Slovenes in Tri-
este still enjoy these same rights today. Italy was com-
pelled to recognize them in 1954 when it took over the 
Trieste area; no new rights of any importance for the 
Slovene minority have been granted by Italy since 1954, 
however. 53 To some degree the Slovenes themselves were 
responsible for many of the setbacks they received. It 
is unlikely they could have done very much to alter the 
basically unfavorable American diplomatic and military 
policies, but certainly it would have been possible for 
them to adopt a more responsible attitude toward the AMG. 
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